The Linkage between WMD Non-Proliferation and the Level of State Development in East Asia by Fukuda Tamotsu & Tamotsu Fukuda
5The Linkage between WMD Non-Proliferation and 
the Level of State Development in East Asia
I. Introduction
How states in East Asia —Northeast and Southeast Asia —respond to the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) —nuclear, biological, 
and chemical weapons—and their delivery systems(1) will influence profoundly 
the shape of international security in the coming decades. East Asia may well 
develop into a world hub of WMD proliferation. Many countries in this region 
are major transshipment and assembly points for critical strategic dual-use 
components and technologies. As Table 1 shows, seven of the top ten world 
‘mega-ports’ are located in East Asia. Some East Asian countries are already 
major acquirers and/or suppliers of WMD-related items. For example, the 
Central Intelligence Agency nominates the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK or North Korea) as one of the world’s major acquirers of WMD 
and name China, North Korea, and Russia as key WMD suppliers (Director of 
Central Intelligence, 2003). In short, WMD proliferation is proceeding much 
more rapidly and extensively in East Asia than any other part of the world.
In addition, East Asia is an area where international relations are often 
troubled by unresolved territorial disputes and historical animosities. The 
proliferation of WMD and ballistic missile capabilities may well exacerbate 
arms race tendencies in the region by creating incentives to counter perceived 
threats either through deterrence (i.e. the development of similar capabilities) 
or defense (i.e. the development of counter-capabilities). Japan once made clear 
that Tokyo would launch a pre-emptive strike on North Korea as a self-defense 
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measure if there were evidence that Pyongyang was fuelling missiles for an 
attack. If the DPRK possessed nuclear weapons capability, not only Japan but 
also South Korea and Taiwan may come under pressure to develop their own 
nuclear deterrent capability, leading to nuclearization of Northeast Asia. This 
will incur an unbearable damage on global non-proliferation community.
The proliferation of WMD is a global security issue. Countries of concern 
continue to pursue WMD programs by purchasing WMD-related goods and 
technologies. Of increasing alarm is the possibility that WMD-related items can 
fall into the hands of terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda that are seeking 
to inflict mass casualties. Unless countries can effectively regulate transfers 
of such materials and technologies, they become breeding grounds for WMD 
terrorism. Although it is a global problem, this article emphasizes region-wide 
non-proliferation efforts. But, this is to suggest neither that a regional approach 
is better than a global one nor that the former should take the central role. The 
article only assumes that that WMD proliferation is a world-wide issue does not 
mean that it has to be addressed only at the global level; regional cooperation 
can also play an important role in preventing the proliferation of WMD. 
Still, regionalism has two notable advantages over globalism. First, because 
countries are more familiar with and knowledgeable about their neighboring 
partners than those of the opposite end of the globe, they can devise modes 
Washington File.
Table 1. World Mega-Ports
  1. Hong Kong
  2. Shanghai
  3. Singapore
  4. Kaohsiung
6. Pusan
8. Tokyo
10. Yantian
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of proliferation management (e.g. verification and safeguards systems) 
specifically adapted to the conditions and requirements of the region, reflecting 
particularities and preferences of regional countries. For example, one of the 
important characteristics of regional cooperation in East Asia is that the countries 
prefer informal processes and institutional arrangements to formal structures. 
They also prefer consultation and consensus decision-making. Cooperation 
based on such regional features may prove more practical than the one that is 
regardless of them. Given the regional differences and the various causes of 
proliferation, it would indeed be surprising if a global approach was successful 
in dealing with all regions. Second, some countries remain outside international 
non-proliferation treaties and regimes. The DPRK is not a party to the Chemical 
Weapons Convention and, though agreed to return, announced to withdraw from 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). By addressing the complexities 
of the regional security environment, regional non-proliferation efforts can 
supplement efforts made at the global level. 
While there are a number of measures to curb WMD proliferation, this 
article gives emphasis on export controls because, though the rationales for 
WMD acquisition vary from state to state, the WMD programs of non-Permanent 
Five states, such as North Korea, Iran, Libya, India and Pakistan, share two 
characteristics: (1) most rely heavily on foreign military and dual-use items 
and (2) most use legitimate commercial channels as cover for illicit transfers 
(Cupitt et al., 2001, p.70). These characteristics suggest that export controls on 
the transfer of WMD-related items can play a critical role in stemming WMD 
proliferation. 
This article makes two related arguments. First, while the (neo)realist-
neoliberal line of argument may explain the non-proliferation incentive of 
developed countries, it does poorly in the case of developing countries in East 
Asia. An explanation based on the level of state development offers a more 
convincing account. The level of state development approach suggests that 
state preferences differ in accordance with the level of state development a 
state is in. The central objective of the government in developing countries is 
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modernization or state development.(2) The willingness of developing countries 
to strengthen WMD non-proliferation efforts is thus influenced by how such 
effort affects the process of state development. The second argument of this 
article is thus the following: In East Asia where developing countries outnumber 
developed countries, the main driving force of overall regional non-proliferation 
cooperation is the common interest in modernization. 
To advance the first argument, it is first necessary to elaborate on how 
(neo)realism and neoliberalism, the two principal theoretical approaches in 
International Relations, explain the emergence of inter-state cooperation against 
the proliferation of WMD. This is the subject of the first section. This section 
highlights that despite differences in their emphases, the two schools of thought 
show a notable commonality on the driving force of WMD non-proliferation 
cooperation. After challenging the (neo)realist-neoliberal position by indicating 
discrepancies between the expected and actual state actions, the next section 
offers an alternative explanation based on the level of state development. 
It illustrates differences in non-proliferation efforts between developed and 
developing countries, and contends that such differences originate in the 
divergence in the level of state development among East Asian states. Finally, 
the last section briefly reflects on the findings of this article.
II.  Why States Cooperate on WMD Non-Proliferation? The (Neo) 
Realist–Neoliberal Approach 
As to why states cooperate on preventing the proliferation of WMD, (neo) 
realism offers an explanation. The (neo) realists argue that in an anarchical 
international system where a central governing authority is non-existent, states 
are preoccupied with augmenting their military and economic power in order to 
ensure survival. Neglect of this business of enhancing state power will endanger 
their survival because states constantly look for opportunities to take advantage 
of others. States are thus in a competitive, self-help international system wherein 
they can rely only on themselves in achieving national security and maintaining 
survival. States are also compelled to balance the power of others. Because 
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states operate in the constant struggle to survive, they are necessarily concerned 
about the relative gains of others. In such an environment under anarchy, 
states attempt to maintain security essentially in two ways. They either seek to 
augment power through self-help or choose to form an alliance with others. The 
latter option is especially useful against a common external threat. Alliances are 
most commonly considered as a response to an external threat, whose primary 
purpose is to combine the capabilities of the members to further their interests 
(Walt, 1997, pp.157-8).
Cooperation to curb WMD proliferation can be understood as a form 
of alliance. According to the realist/neorealist perspective, states develop 
compatible export control systems as a prudent response to the emergence of 
a common threat to national security. States in the same region, moreover, can 
readily form a regional alliance if the menace —i.e. WMD proliferation —
is regarded as a threat to regional security. We should also expect to see a 
greater commitment to WMD non-proliferation in those states that are seeking 
to balance the power of a particular (group of) state(s) or non-state actor(s) 
by controlling the flow of WMD-related components to them. Furthermore, 
export controls will be more developed in those states that perceive such effort 
as enhancing their security relative to others, especially to certain target states/
actors whom they wish to balance against (Grillot, 1998, pp.3-5).
Neoliberalism, a competing approach to (neo)realism, also provides a 
convincing explanation. Although the neoliberal approach emphasizes a different 
aspect of international relations from that of (neo) realism, it suggests a similar 
account. With the assumption that states rationally calculate the material costs 
and benefits, the neoliberals argue that the proliferation of WMD is a common 
security challenge that threatens the security of all states. While the extent of 
threat to which WMD proliferation poses to security differs from region to region 
(e.g., it is given a low profile in the security agenda of the Pacific Island states) 
and from state to state (e.g., North Korea’s nuclear program poses a greater threat 
to Japan than to, say, Brunei), it is a transnational security issue. Proliferators of 
WMD-related materials cannot be determined in an a priori manner, especially 
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if they are non-state actors. In an age of increasingly complex interdependence 
and globalization, WMD materials and technologies can be transferred through 
normal trade channels. Recent revelations of the involvement of Malaysian-
based entities in the Abdul Qadeer Khan nuclear smuggling network, which 
exposed that a rogue trading network linked to nuclear black market was located 
and operated in Malaysia, illustrates the ubiquitous and unpredictable nature of 
WMD proliferation. The emergence of such a common security issue facilitates 
inter-state cooperation. Because no state alone can effectively manage, let alone 
solve, such a transnational security challenge, it is in the interest of all states to 
cope with it through cooperation. Inter-state cooperation thus becomes a shared 
interest among states. 
The existence of common interests promotes states to maximize their 
absolute gains. The existence of common security problems also creates a 
positive-sum situation, thereby eliminating, or at least markedly ameliorating, 
relative gains concerns. Since world politics is operated in a competitive, self-
help environment, relative gains considerations are regarded as one of the two 
primary obstacles to inter-state cooperation (Mearsheimer, 1994/95, pp.5-49). 
However, because resolving or managing common security problems such as 
WMD proliferation is an interest to all and benefits every one roughly equally, 
states will seek to maximize absolute as opposed to relative gains. For example, 
the decreased likelihood of international terrorists like al Qaeda-linked Jemaah 
Islamiah’s acquiring WMD capabilities is a gain for all the states in East Asia. 
The neoliberals also argue that states with common interests (e.g. tackling WMD 
proliferation) create international institutions or regimes (e.g. the NPT) to reduce 
transaction costs and uncertainty in their future interactions (Grillot, 1998, 
pp.5-6). 
While the two theoretical approaches emphasize contrasting aspects of 
international relations, on the issue of WMD non-proliferation they coincide 
on the view that the states’ recognition that WMD proliferation constitutes 
a common threat to security is the main driver for non-proliferation effort. 
According to these theoretical approaches, we should expect that states in East 
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Asia are making strenuous efforts roughly equally to prevent the proliferation 
of WMD because a fledgling export control system of even one country could 
undermine non-proliferation efforts made elsewhere in the region. 
As these theoretical schools of thought suggest, the realization that the 
proliferation of WMD constitutes a common threat to security is permeating 
in the region. In July 2004, leaders of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the 
only multilateral institution focusing on regional security issues, released a 
joint statement, ARF Statement on Non-Proliferation, pledging to strengthen 
cooperation on WMD non-proliferation. Noting that the proliferation of WMD 
increases the risk that terrorists gain access to WMD, the members stressed the 
importance of a multilateral approach to non-proliferation and arms control 
(ASEAN Regional Forum Statement on Non-Proliferation, 2004). The joint 
statement also urged ARF members to “redouble” non-proliferation efforts, 
including reinforcement of national export controls, information sharing, 
cooperation on preventing illicit trafficking of items related to WMD, and the 
strengthening of legal frameworks for criminalizing the export of equipment 
and technology that could lead to WMD proliferation (ASEAN Regional Forum 
Statement on Non-Proliferation, 2004).
As issues of trade, security, and non-proliferation are intertwined, Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) also addresses the issue of WMD 
proliferation. Based on the 2003 Bangkok Declaration on Partnership for the 
Future to introduce and adopt strict export control regulations, APEC leaders 
adopted APEC Key Elements for Effective Export Control Systems, a joint 
proposal of Japan and the United States, at the meeting in November 2004 
in Santiago, Chile. Agreeing to work together to strengthen export control 
capacities of the APEC members, leaders highlighted four elements for effective 
export control: legal and regulatory framework, licensing procedures and practice, 
enforcement, and industry outreach (APEC Key Elements for Effective Export 
Control Systems, 2004). Moreover, the APEC members established guidelines on 
the control of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems exports, which could be used 
by terrorists to attack civilian aviation (Joint Statement of the Sixteenth APEC 
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Ministerial Meeting, 2004). 
However, a glance at the participation record of East Asian countries in 
international non-proliferation treaties and regimes(3) (see Tables 2 and 3) 
indicates that the (neo)realist-neoliberal line of argument does not explain 
well the dynamics of overall non-proliferation efforts in the region. Their 
participation is at variance with the (neo)realist-neoliberal anticipation of state 
performance that states, based on the shared recognition that WMD proliferation 
is a common threat to security, would be making roughly equally efforts to curb 
such proliferation. In contrast, Tables 2 and 3 show that WMD non-proliferation 
efforts vary from state to state. For example, while Japan and South Korea are 
members of all of the relevant arrangements, the participation of other countries 
is spotty, especially that of Southeast Asian states. None of the ASEAN states 
is a party to key export control regimes such as the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Therefore, the 
shared threat perception is not a primary driver in this region. What, then, is 
the main driving force? This article posits that it is states’ common interest in 
modernization.
III. WMD Non-Proliferation and State Development
1. The Level of State Development
East Asia is a region where developed and developing states co-exist. 
Even though the proliferation of WMD equally threatens the security of both 
developed and developing countries, how does the divergence in the level of 
state development affect WMD non-proliferation efforts? 
In accordance with the level of state development a state is in, it is natural 
that the goals and preferences of states differ. And, the divergence in state 
preferences naturally generates differences in their attitudes toward WMD non-
proliferation. We begin with developing countries since they predominate in East 
Asia. Developing countries are considered as those states that have achieved a 
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certain level of political stability, but not yet reached maturity (Tanaka, 1996, 
p.201). Developing countries are thus still in the midst of state-building. For 
developing countries, accordingly, the central agenda is state development or the 
strengthening of the state through modernization (Fukuyama, 2004, pp.100-1). 
In economic terms, we should expect that developing countries are cooperative 
Table 2. Selected International Treaties
Sources: Reports submitted to the 1540 Committee of the UN Security Council.
Available from http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/report.html; 
Monterey Institute of International Studies, “Inventory of International 
Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes.” http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/inven/ 
index.htm; Asian Export Control Observer (various issues).
Note: 1 Announced to withdraw in January 2003, but agreed to return in 
September 2005. 
2  The IAEA’s ability to monitor nuclear activities was completely lost in 
December 2002 when North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors.
3  Notified its intent to sign.
International Treaties:
BWC: Biological Weapons Convention (1972) 
CWC: Chemical Weapons Convention (1993)
NPT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968)
IAEA SA: IAEA Safeguards Agreement (1957)
IAEA AP: IAEA Additional Protocol (1997)
Country BWC CWC NPT IAEASA
IAEA
AP
x
x
x
 (x)3
x
x
 (x)3
 (x)3
x
x
x
 (x)2
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
 (x)1
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
China
Japan
ROK
DPRK
Brunei
Cambodia
Indonesia
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam
14 15
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to WMD non-proliferation when such effort is fruitful to economic prosperity 
and, conversely, they are averse to such effort if it is viewed as detrimental to 
economic growth. 
It should be noted that the linkage between WMD non-proliferation 
and economic development is not novel; it has been one of the features that 
characterized the debate of nuclear non-proliferation during the Cold War, 
especially in the 1960s and the 1970s (Naya, 2000, pp.11-15; Subrahmanyam, 
1992, pp.135-44). It was one of the North-South controversies. Developing 
Sources: Reports submitted to the UN Security Council Committee 1540. 
Available from http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/report.html; 
Monterey Institute of International Studies, “Inventory of International 
Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes.” Available from 
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/inven/ index.htm.
Note: 1 Applied to membership in 2003 and its bid is under discussion.
Global Export Control Regimes:
AG: Australia Group (1985)
MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime (1987)
NSG: Nuclear Suppliers Group (1975)
WA: Wassenaar Arrangement (1996)
HCOC: Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (2002)
Table 3. Selected Global Export Control Regimes
Country AG MTCR NSG WA HCOC
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
 (x)1
x
x
x
x
China
Japan
ROK
DPRK
Brunei
Cambodia
Indonesia
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam
14 15
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countries criticized that the NPT is a manifestation of inequality in which 
developed countries controlled and limited the flow of advanced technology 
to developing countries, slowing the process of modernization of the latter. 
However, as Masatsugu Naya points out, one of the important reasons behind 
the progress in WMD non-proliferation effort in the post-Cold War period is the 
adaptation of developing countries to the economically deeply interdependent 
international community (Naya, 2000, p.17). In such an international 
community, developing countries have come to increasingly recognize that 
the possession of WMD does not carry much weight in pursuing their national 
interests (Naya, 2000, p.17). Given this point addressed by Naya, therefore, it is 
important to reiterate the linkage between WMD non-proliferation and economic 
development. 
Modernization also involves political development. Political development 
is the growth in the capacity of states (governments) to govern and to organize 
for political action (Hagopian, 2000, p.902). Understood as such, political 
development requires internal and external legitimacy; that is, the government 
in power is supported by most, if not all, of its populace and regarded as 
morally right, and its state sovereignty and territorial integrity are recognized 
internationally. Developing countries, as a result, place special importance on 
norms of sovereignty and domestic non-interference and domestic political 
legitimacy. In relation to WMD non-proliferation efforts, we should anticipate 
that developing countries are supportive of non-proliferation if such effort 
strengthens domestic political legitimacy. They would also be cooperative if it 
does not impinge on state sovereignty or interfere in their domestic issues. 
Developed countries, on the other hand, are more cooperative to prevention 
of WMD proliferation for two reasons. First, developed countries are those 
that are matured politically and economically. Politically matured means that 
institutional capacity —the ability to formulate and carry out policies —is well 
developed. This suggests that developed countries can perform well in export 
controls. Second, developed countries may be more closely tied to the threat 
of WMD proliferation because prosperous countries are generally more likely 
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to produce, consume, or re-export items of proliferation concern (Cupitt et al., 
2001, p.71). Moreover, developed states may regard the proliferation of WMD 
as more threatening to their national security than developing countries, due 
to their high level of economic and security interdependence. A high degree 
of interdependence can serve as a transmission belt for spreading security 
problems throughout the region as well as the world. Hence, developed states are 
concerned about each other. This is even the case between geographically distant 
countries such as Germany and Japan, as they are bound together by extremely 
well-developed transportation and communications networks (Tanaka, 1996, 
p.197). Given their intensive political, economic, and social interactions across 
societies, developed states face an increased threat of proliferation. In East Asia, 
generally speaking, in addition to Japan, Singapore and South Korea can be 
considered as developed states. China and other ASEAN states are classified as 
developing countries. 
2. Developed Countries
Three developed countries in East Asia—Japan, South Korea, and 
Singapore—are keen on WMD non-proliferation and tend to participate more 
actively in such effort than other regional countries. As already stated, Japan 
and South Korea are members of all the cardinal international non-proliferation 
treaties and regimes. Singapore, on the other hand, does not participate in any 
global export control regimes (see Tables 2 and 3). Nevertheless, Singapore has 
developed national export control systems that are consistent with key export 
control regimes such as the Australia Group, the NSG, the MTCR, and the 
Wassenaar Arrangement (Yuan, 2004b, p.15). Singapore probably has the most 
comprehensive export control systems in Southeast Asia (Asian Export Control 
Observer, December 2004/January 2005, p.9). Also, Singapore is actively 
cooperating with other countries in the pursuit of WMD non-proliferation. 
Only two East Asian states —Japan and Singapore — participate in the 
American-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which is designed to stop 
the spread of WMD by intercepting suspect shipments from flowing to and 
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from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern. Japan hosted the twelfth 
PSI interdiction exercise in Sagami Bay in October 2004, whereas Singapore 
hosted the eighteenth in the South China Sea in August 2005. While South 
Korea remains outside of the Initiative for fear of provoking North Korea, Seoul 
expressed cautious support for the PSI. 
Japan plays a key leadership role in regional non-proliferation efforts. 
Japan’s efforts were initially driven by its fear of North Korea acquiring WMD 
capabilities, but Japan is now active enough to seek to construct an Asian export 
control community, a regional network centering on Japan (Hosokawa, 2003, 
pp.43-44). Tokyo has organized the Asian Export Control Seminar (since 1993), 
the Asian Export Control Policy Dialogue (since 2003), and the Asian Senior-
Level Talks on Non-Proliferation or ASTOP (since 2003). The central aim of 
these programs is enhancement of regional awareness of the importance of 
export controls and provision of relevant East Asian officials with professional 
and technical expertise. Also, as pledged in the 2003 Tokyo Declaration for 
the Dynamic and Enduring Japan-ASEAN Partnership in the New Millennium 
and the attendant Japan-ASEAN Plan of Action, Japanese Foreign Ministry 
representatives visited ten ASEAN countries in February 2004 to exchange 
views and strengthen non-proliferation cooperation (Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2004). 
3. Developing Countries
Because the primary task of developing countries is state development, 
they accord top priority to economic development. But, export controls can 
be an impediment to economic prosperity. In 1999, for example, the United 
States shifted controls on commercial satellite items from the Commerce 
Control List to the Munitions List, where items face more severe restrictions. 
In the subsequent twelve months, the value of U.S. commercial satellite exports 
declined from $1.08 billion to $637 million and the U.S. global market share 
dropped from 73 percent to 52 percent (Reinsch, 2000; Cupitt et al., 2001, p.70). 
U.S. Department of Commerce officials attribute most of this dramatic decline to 
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the changes in export controls (Reinsch, 2000; Cupitt et al., 2001, p.70).
As expected, many developing countries in East Asia have been reluctant 
to tighten export controls. China has been most outspoken about this matter 
by arguing that global non-proliferation regimes unreasonably limit legitimate 
right of developing states to economic development. For example, Beijing 
“strongly opposes the actions by the member states of the Australia Group in 
obstructing the normal chemical trade between State Parties to the [Chemical 
Weapons] Convention under the pretext of non-proliferation” (PRC Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 2002). While it has recently become more committed to 
non-proliferation, China still maintains this position. China’s first White Paper 
on non-proliferation entitled China’s Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures 
writes that it is important that all countries “strike a proper balance between 
non-proliferation and international cooperation for peaceful use of relevant 
high technologies” so as to “guarantee the rights of all countries, especially the 
developing nations, to utilize and share dual-use scientific and technological 
achievements and products” (Information Office of the State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2003, Section I).
The aforementioned A.Q. Kahn nuclear smuggling network in Malaysia also 
provides an example in which the Malaysian government’s interests in economic 
development militated against non-proliferation. Malaysia has been seeking to 
develop the country as an international center for advanced engineering through 
the development of economic infrastructure and marketing. Abdul Razak 
Baginda, executive director of the Malaysian Strategic Research Center, argues 
that because the Malaysian government has been pushing hard to attract foreign 
investment to realize that goal, a business proposal put forward by Buhary 
Syed Abu Tahir, Kahn’s right-hand man, to manufacture advanced machine 
components for oil and gas industry was attractive to the government (Sipress, 
2004, p.A12). As a result, local officials apparently did not press Tahir about the 
ultimate use of the exported centrifuge components (Sipress, 2004, p.A12).
Malaysia’s comprehensive report on national non-proliferation policies 
submitted to the 1540 Committee, which was established by the UN 
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Security Council Resolution 1540 on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, confirms this point. Although Kuala Lumpur admits that it lacks 
a comprehensive WMD export control systems, and despite the existence 
of the Kahn nuclear network within the country, Malaysia neither alluded 
to any significant weaknesses in its system nor declared its intention to sign 
the Additional Protocol to its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Permanent Mission of Malaysia 
to the United Nations, 2004; New Straits Times, February 2004, p.2). And, the 
report stated that current “export control laws and regulations are mainly based 
on economic reasons” (Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations, 
2004, p. 8). Similarly, Indonesia has long viewed export control regimes as 
barriers to economic development (Asian Export Control Observer, December 
2004/January 2005, p.7). Because economic development is given one of the 
highest priorities, as Cupitt and others point out, it is often the case that officials 
in many developing countries “stress the primacy of economic prosperity in their 
national strategies, with few expressing any real concern that WMD proliferation 
poses much direct risk to their national security” (Cupitt et al., 2001, pp.71-72). 
That interests in modernization are driving WMD non-proliferation effort 
is also illustrated by China’s recent improvement in non-proliferation efforts. 
China began improving its non-proliferation efforts in the 1990s. For instance, 
China had signed about 10 to 20 percent of all arms control treaties it was 
eligible to sign in 1970, but it acceded to 85 to 90 percent of such agreements by 
1996 (Swaine and Johnston, 1999, p.101). Beijing signed the NPT in 1992; the 
Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993; the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 
1996; and the Protocol Additional to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement in 1997. 
China became a member of Zangger Committee in 1997; joined the NSG in 
2004; and is now seeking entry to MTCR (Monterey Institute of International 
Studies, 2004). Despite its critical views on WMD non-proliferation regimes, 
why has China acceded to these export control arrangements?
The answer is its interests in economic development. Beijing recognizes 
that its economic development depends to a significant degree on transfers of 
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advanced Western technology and foreign investment. The United States, one of 
the largest sources of foreign direct investment and high technology transfers to 
China, has played a particularly significant role in the improvement of Chinese 
non-proliferation efforts. Washington has either offered to allow Beijing greater 
access to U.S. technology or waived sanctions in return for China’s pledges 
or actions to halt selling items of WMD proliferation concern. Negotiations of 
the 1985 Sino-U.S. Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, deals estimated 
to have a value of U.S. 15 billion dollars through 2010, illustrate the impact of 
economic incentives (Hu, 1999, p.134). During his visit to the United States 
in October 1997, President Jiang Zemin was believed to give four pledges 
to President Clinton. First, China would not provide nuclear technology to 
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in any country. Second, China was to strengthen 
nuclear export control regulations. Third, China responded favorably to the U.S. 
suggestion to join the Zangger Committee. Fourth, Beijing provided written 
assurances to Washington that it would not engage in nuclear cooperation with 
Iran. In return for these pledges and actions, Clinton certified to Congress that 
China was no longer engaging in any nuclear proliferation (Gill and Medeiros, 
2000, pp.79-81; Yuan, 2004a, pp.156-7, 164-5). The Sino-U.S. Nuclear 
Cooperation Agreement went into effect in March 1998. In addition, Chinese 
CSCAP members see development of a better export control regime as a critical 
part of China’s attempt to modernize its economy (Glosserman, 2003). It should 
be noted, however, that U.S. economic inducements produced mixed results: 
there are instances where U.S. offer of access to advanced technology has been 
declined by China. Nevertheless, what underlies Chinese behavior remains the 
same: economic interests. As Jing-dong Yuan observes, the mixed results of 
the American strategy are a “reflection of Beijing’s assessment of its national 
interests after weighing expected rewards (Western technologies) against forsaken 
commercial opportunities (missile/nuclear transfers) (Yuan, 2004a, p.165).
The political aspect of state interests in modernization is well illustrated in 
the case of the DPRK. More specifically, in case of North Korea it is interests 
in state survival, rather than state development. As Tables 2 and 3 show, North 
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Korea is hardly cooperative to WMD non-proliferation. Pyongyang is believed 
to have reneged on the obligations of few of the treaties it is actually a state 
party of. It is the U.S. official view that North Korea has an active biological 
weapons program and may have weaponized biological weapons agents in 
violation of the Biological Weapons Convention. In December 2002, to cite 
the most recent example, North Korea removed all seals and IAEA monitoring 
equipment from Yongbyon nuclear facilities, moved one thousand fuel rods 
into the reactor, and expelled IAEA inspectors from the country. North Korea 
announced its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003. The country is not only 
uncooperative, but in fact it is an active proliferant. North Korea is believed to 
have sold missiles and missile technology to Egypt, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, 
Vietnam and Yemen (Lintner and Stecklow, 2003, p.13). 
While there are divisions over North Korea’s nuclear intentions among 
analysts, it seems most likely that Pyongyang views nuclear weapons as a 
guarantor to its survival. Although developing nuclear forces is not cheap, 
today’s rapid technological change constantly threatens the military value of 
conventional forces, and thus maintenance of that conventional military value 
will be far more expensive than nuclear investment (Goldstein, 2000, pp.54-55. 
Pyongyang would have to very quickly develop by itself or acquire from 
others state-of-the-art conventional forces such as precision-guided munitions, 
electronic countermeasures and stealth technology. It must also counter 
quantitative and qualitative improvements in the capabilities of the United 
States and South Korea. Given its economic difficulties and the already existing 
military imbalance between the North and the South, achieving and maintaining 
the level of military comparability with the United States and South Korea 
is simply impossible for North Korea. As Avery Goldstein contends, nuclear 
weapons “enable states to satisfy basic security requirements self-reliantly 
and relatively economically. They are not cheap but when married to deterrent 
doctrines nuclear weapons can dissuade even much more powerful adversaries 
without incurring the high costs of comparably effective conventional defenses” 
(Goldstein, 2000, p.225). Kim Yong Il, Vice Foreign Minister of the DPRK, 
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clearly stated in his keynote speech at the first round of the six-party talks that 
North Korea’s nuclear deterrent force is “a means for self-defense to protect 
our sovereignty” (“Six-Party Talks on the North Korea Nuclear Crisis, Beijing, 
August 27-29,” 2004). This is why the DPRK is so vehement not to give up its 
nuclear weapons program. 
Moreover, Pyongyang’s missile proliferation is driven primarily to earn hard 
currency in order to keep its economy from collapsing. In fact, missile sales are 
the chief means to acquire foreign currencies. Kim Dok Hong, a North Korean 
defector who ran a company involved in arms trade, states that the missile 
sales make up as much as forty percent of North Korea’s exports (Lintner and 
Stecklow, 2003, p.13). It is no wonder why the DPRK is uncooperative to WMD 
non-proliferation. 
IV. Concluding Remarks
This article has argued that the level of state development approach can 
better explain the dynamics of overall East Asian WMD non-proliferation 
efforts than the (neo)realist-neoliberal line of argument. Given the fact that a 
rudimentary export control system of even one country could compromise non-
proliferation efforts made elsewhere in the region, how developing countries, 
whose non-proliferation performance falls behind that of developed countries, 
buttress their effort significantly influences the effectiveness of the overall 
regional non-proliferation cooperation. The level of state development approach 
suggests that to accelerate WMD non-proliferation endeavor, factors related to 
modernization can promote developing states’ efforts. China is a case in point, in 
which American economic inducements played an important role in improving 
China’s non-proliferation practice. 
It is important that non-proliferation efforts are not viewed as obstacles 
to economic development. Developed countries must continue stressing the 
importance of non-proliferation, but at the same time should give greater 
credence to the value of assisting developing countries to prosper. The DPRK 
presents a more difficult, complicated case, since economic incentives alone 
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東アジアには、大量破壊兵器生産に使われる機器や技術を含む軍事・汎用品の積み
替え（トランスシップメント）地点となる世界の主要港が多く存在するため、当該地
域は船舶を利用した物流の要衝となっている。また、北朝鮮や中国等を始め、WMD
またはWMD関連製品を供与ないし獲得している国が既に存在している。よって、東
アジア諸国のWMD拡散防止への取り組みは、地域の安全だけでなく国際安全保障全
体にも多大な影響を与える。
現実主義と新自由主義は、それぞれ国際関係の競争と協調といった正反対の側面を
強調するが、国家をWMD不拡散取り組みに駆り立てる主要因に関しては、共通点を
見出している。それは、それぞれの論理は異なるものの、「WMD拡散が国家安全保
障に対する脅威である」という共通の認識である。実際に、東アジア諸国の取り組み
と比較してみると、この現実主義及び新自由主義の視点は、先進国の不拡散取り組み
を説明する上では有用であるかもしれないが、発展途上国の取り組みを十分に説明し
得ない。つまり、東アジア全体の大量破壊兵器不拡散取り組みの力学を説明するには
不十分である。東アジア諸国の国家発展段階に着目したアプローチは、当該地域の不
拡散取り組みを説明する上でより適していると考えられる。
東アジアは、先進国と発展途上国が共存する地域であるが、発展途上国のほうがよ
り多く存在している。発展途上国は、国家建設過程にある国であり、よって、発展途
上国の最優先事項は近代化ないし国家発展である。その結果、発展途上諸国が大量破
壊兵器不拡散取り組みにより積極的に関わるのは、近代化、つまり政治・経済発展に
寄与すると判断された時である。反対に、そのような取り組みが国家発展を阻害しう
ると判断された場合は、発展途上諸国は消極的な態度をとる。中国の、不拡散協力と
発展途上国の経済発展の釣り合いを保つことが重要であるという主張は、発展途上国
東アジアにおける大量破壊兵器不拡散と
国家発展段階の連関
＜　要　約　＞
福田　保
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にとっての近代化の重要性を示す好例である。大量破壊兵器不拡散への取り組みは、
輸出規制が緩い国が一国でも存在すると、地域全体の取り組みをも害すことになるた
め、東アジアにおける不拡散取り組みの有効性は発展途上諸国のそれに依拠している
と言って良い。換言すれば、当該地域全体の不拡散取り組みの成否を左右する要因は、
近代化・国家発展を遂行するという、発展途上国共通の利害であると言える。
